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Abstract. Ever since we first came across it, art has allowed us to see a sight enriched 
with the impression of entering a territory of our own. From its very beginning, art is 
the visible expression of the passages between images, the making visible of its own 
laws, its analogies and affinities. Walter Benjamin already shed light on  the “auratic” 
value of such transformations, and while he is known for stating that photography 
causes a degradation of the aura, it is no less true, though less known, that that loss 
is redeemed by the aura photography carries in itself. Image’s secret, its potency and 
splendour, lies precisely in that distance between image and thing, between word and 
thing. In photography – as a medium inheriting water’s and mirror’s powers of reflec-
tion – the leaning over one’s own reflection (the Greeks called it Narcissus) is ‘magi-
cally’ reinstated.
Keywords. Image, expression, mirror, unrepresentable, witness.
1. THE ANIMAL THAT STEPS BACK
No image is more completely virtual than the image produced by 
the mind. In fact, though we see and hear through these images, we 
neither see nor hear them. It is only at the moment when discrep-
ancies emerge between what we see and the possibility of seeing or 
between what we hear and the possibility of hearing, in severe cases 
of sight or hearing pathologies, that we become aware, via a trou-
bling fracture, that the condition of seeing can only be recognised in 
sight and that contact with that condition in its pure state deprives 
us of any familiarity with what seemed to us most familiar, and 
indeed is most familiar: the ability to see, the ability to hear.   
To see sight, to hear hearing, or to become aware of the disap-
pearance of the concord between the image and what it represents 
and presents, are instances of violent separation between a theme 
and its development, between a force and its effects. And yet, art, 
ever since we first came across it, in Palaeolithic engravings, paint-
ings and sculptures, has allowed us, right from the start, to see a 
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sight free of that disturbing shade of strangeness: 
to the contrary, that seeing is enriched with the 
impression of entering a territory of our own, 
because here sight absorbs its own conditions, 
presenting the mode of seeing as embodied in an 
aspect belonging to the seen and glimpsed thing. 
By this I mean that from the beginning art is the 
visible expression of the passages between images, 
the making visible of its own laws, its analogies 
and affinities, all of them insusceptible of being 
turned into operable rules, the making visible of 
how imagination works, and this via the produc-
tion of a certain image. 
The experience of passages, approximations 
and metamorphoses that is apparently the lot of 
those who explore certain drugs (and also, though 
not precisely on the same level, the lot of those 
who dream) includes, it is said, an affinity with 
that experience of seeing the image as it takes 
shape, that terrifying, astonishing and delight-
ful standing-out that occurs as each seen thing 
becomes a gaze. All this can be found in Walter 
Benjamin’s descriptions of his experiments with 
hashish1. He called that transformation ‘aura’ and, 
while he is known for stating that photography 
causes a degradation of the aura, it is no less true, 
though less known, that that loss is redeemed by 
the aura photography carries in itself. 
Before Plato managed to subdue his passion 
for images by means of no less powerful concepts, 
the Greeks had a flawless love for appearances: 
the gods could only be recognised through their 
images, made by poets, sculptors and painters, and 
the poets tell us that, as the gods walked among 
men, their divinity manifested now as the peculiar 
gleam of a warrior’s ferocity, now as the sagacity 
of a beggar-woman’s advice, now as the majestic 
and precise movements of an eagle, now as the 
sudden change in direction of the smoke rising 
from a sacrifice: beings, forces and forms whose 
signs the Greeks learned to read from infancy. 
The Platonic classification of degrees of real-
ity2 is like a long and subtle disciplining of such 
1 See Benjamin [1927].
2 See Plato [2013].
excesses, which Plato could not, in fact, abol-
ish or avoid, because they were sanctioned by his 
own tradition. That is certainly the reason why he 
was saddled with the challenging, insuperable and 
wondrous task of defining what may be an image. 
A reflection on water, a few brushstrokes on an 
amphora, a crater, or a funerary vase, in which we 
can recognise the likeness of Achilles, the shape 
of a rock called Athena, the shadow of a lighted 
body, have in common among themselves the fact 
of being a relationship with an other. Let us look 
at two of them. 
Phaedrus’ reflection on the river Ilisius is not 
Phaedrus, but Socrates may lovingly focus his gaze 
on the water and contemplate Phaedrus. Achilles’ 
painted likeness is not as powerful as Pheadrus’ 
presence, as he leans over the river, for painting 
shows us a being that has never been reflected, 
but it is also true that we expect – whether we are 
able to recognise him or not – and so does the 
painter, most fervently, Achilles to lean over the 
brushstrokes and recognise himself in them. A 
movement proper to imagination, the originary 
image, into which vibrantly converge that which 
we expect from Achilles, that which contaminates 
and sustains all expectations regarding Achilles, 
and that which only the artist can compose, is the 
image with which we compare – even if we do not 
acknowledge it – the colour patches that made 
Achilles, painted Achilles, visible3.
To live off an other, to replace an other, to 
reproduce, to offer news of an other, to degrade an 
other, to trick one who is looking for that other, to 
cause an other to shine for the first time: these are 
some Platonic approaches to the image. Not only 
are we unable to rid ourselves of them all at once, 
but besides that we are able to contemplate them 
all at once, thus suffering their paradoxical effects, 
the result of simultaneously looking at what is lost 
and what is gained with the images. 
 If we give priority to what is lost, we are sup-
posing (by either lending it the dignity of an axi-
om or obscurely accepting it) that a knowledge 
devoid of an image is ontologically superior or 
3 See Plato [1990].
199A territory of our own
that there are beings who do not need an image 
to know and are for that reason superior, a sup-
position that is usually accompanied by a similar 
distrust of language, a distrust that originates in a 
dream, a deep longing for communicating with-
out the mediation of the articulated sounds of 
one’s voice. And yet, it is precisely in that distance 
between image and thing, between word and thing 
– whatever the image, word and thing may be – 
in all of its degrees, that lies the image’s secret, 
its potency and splendour: we are unable to tear 
Phaedrus’ reflection off the water; the communica-
tion of that secret is art’s task. Plato feared it. 
Phaedrus steps back from his reflection and 
disappears. Sorrow concerning images, any image, 
contains the more or less obscure, more or less 
clear awareness of the fact that Phaedrus always 
steps back from his reflection. Even if he has nev-
er, strictly speaking, faced Plato’s written words as 
he faced the water, Phaedrus is in them, Phaedrus 
hovers over them, between them, forever hovers 
before the gaze of the one who is reading Plato. 
We, unable to see Phaedrus, can follow the trace 
he left for us in those written words, and only in 
them we are able to follow that trace, a vision of 
Plato. The trace is a sort of vapour, a dust, that 
Phaedrus causes to rise and fall as he steps back.  
Phaedrus steps back from his reflection and 
disappears. We know well that the water will stop 
reflecting Phaedrus, as soon as he steps back and 
disappears (and we also know that he will always 
disappear whenever there is a possibility of him 
being reflected).
Into painting and sculpture converge two 
inseparable ways of stepping back, the stepping 
back of the one being imagined from its image 
(of the reflected one regarding its reflection, of 
the body regarding its shadow, etc.) and the step-
ping back (the reflection, a shadow, a painting, a 
sculpture) from the word. It should be remem-
bered that the image in the word, the image that 
breeds and feeds the word and is bred and fed by 
the word, is not the image of the reflection, of the 
shadow or of the paint patches, but all that con-
veyed by the sounds the voice wants to say (in 
fact, the words are not things, or even images of 
things, but ways of articulating them). 
It must be stressed that the stepping back of 
the imagined from its image is not solely due to a 
deviation outside the image, but also inside it: in 
other words, that outside deviation exists between 
the reflection on the water of Phaedrus’ face and 
the face that is being reflected; but the distance 
between the sculpture of the goddess Athena and 
Athena herself must be evaluated and preserved in 
the sculpture, even though that stepping back may 
never be fully absorbed. As to the second step-
ping back, the one of the image from the word, it 
is proper, there is no other way to put it, to matter 
and its powers, to phýsis, to nature. Like an animal 
that refuses to be touched, the image always steps 
back from those who want to speak of it, and 
that is just as present in the dismal and nauseat-
ing experience of the repetitiveness of images as in 
that image in which something shows itself as an 
image for the first time. 
In photography, the convergence of these 
two forms of stepping back reaches an excessive 
potency, further intensified because in photogra-
phy – and that more intensely than in film, and 
much more radically than in video – this leaning 
over one’s own reflection, which is another move-
ment proper to imagination (the Greeks called it 
Narcissus, whose memory lives in a wintry flower, 
and which we have tortured through psychology), 
is magically reinstated, and ‘magical’ is a word we 
can use here in all its concentrated expressiveness.
2. IMPURE IMAGES
What does photography do to life? Something 
more than painting, etc.? Something completely 
different? Does it expand or annul something that 
is proper to the other arts? Through representa-
tional excess – direct sensibility to light, replace-
ment of the eye with the lens or electronic devices, 
indefinite reproducibility – photography spreads, 
under chronic paradoxical forms, the impossibil-
ity of tearing the imagined away from the image, 
which becomes its intimate source of anxiety. Let 
us attempt to turn that anxiety into a concept. 
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Representation, Unrepresentable, Unrepresentables
Photography is a vehicle, a medium, an instru-
ment of technically reproducible objectified rep-
resentation. Before it, its only ancestors and clos-
est relatives were water (which is an element, not 
a medium) and mirrors. All that holds the power 
to represent, all that is able to represent, can also 
express, but the representational operation may 
cause the distinction between expression and its 
recognition to fade, confusing them and at the 
limit eradicating it.  
Expression is one of the modes of the unrep-
resentable, but let us say it is an unrepresentable 
within the frame of the conditions of possibility of 
representation itself, which has countless natural 
touchstones, as is the case of any sentence in the 
Portuguese language. According to Wittgenstein’s 
exact perception, whenever we say something we 
also show something, which is the very condition 
of saying this and that, in other words, its logical 
form. All representational actions and, likewise, all 
machines that reproduce representation have, so 
to speak, their own logical form4. 
Let us consider this to be the degree of the 
unrepresentable that necessarily accompanies rep-
resentation, as long as there is representation, and 
which cannot be extirpated from it, not only made 
to our measure, but measured by us. That degree 
can undergo several potentiations, up to a point 
in which, in the creation of artworks or in poetic 
speech, it is possible to glimpse the most elevated 
conditions of our imagination, including the con-
dition of seeing an aspect, of presenting some-
thing instead of simply representing it, that which 
is called artistic and poetic expression. Here, the 
distinction between showing and telling, between 
describing and expressing or presenting tends to 
fade, decline; it even experiences the splendour 
of fusion. Here, the image speaks for itself. Once 
again, Wittgenstein comes to help us5.  
There is another degree of the unrepresent-
able, which is not exactly related to the difference 
4 See Wittgenstein [1923].
5 See Wittgenstein [1968].
between what is told and what is shown, and so 
on and so forth, nor to its glorious dissolution. 
That degree of the unrepresentable stems from 
the longing to go beyond the visible, the sensible, 
the body, breathing, the earth and suffering, and 
that regardless of whatever assumption it may be 
tied to. However, there is a certain assumption, 
that the fulfilment, the satisfaction of the longing 
take on the form of a redemption, a preservation 
of the sensible, the body, suffering and the earth, 
and there is also the assumption that this satisfac-
tion will amount to the suppression, the negation 
of the visible and its retinue: to never return to 
the body, to no longer have the earth, to no longer 
suffer. 
Then, the unrepresentables are discussed: God 
and all the invisibles or near-invisibles, which 
include, for instance, death and joy, as well as eve-
rything that is excessively large or powerful in the 
visible sphere. 
We are in the realm of imagination, in the 
splendour and fall of its symbolic power, which 
draws pleasure and induces knowledge through 
the formation of connections, through the inner-
vation and rousing of plots that stabilise them-
selves into tangible figures. That force cannot 
expand itself limitlessly: the realm of imagination, 
like any other realm, has its own borders. Con-
fronted with certain kinds of vastness (a mountain 
range) and a certain level of potency (a stormy 
sea), imagination finds itself unable to fulfil simul-
taneously the operations of apprehension and 
comprehension: when it reaches its borders, imag-
ination stops producing analogies, creating affini-
ties or stimulating the formation of connections 
and figures. 
However, against all appearances, the unrep-
resentables, as both the kind of beings that can 
only be figured indirectly and the kind of beings 
for which imagination has only one gesture, to 
plunge into itself, to sacrifice itself, these unrepre-
sentables (roughly based on the Kantian distinc-
tion of the beautiful and the sublime6) also fall 
within our measure, a sentimental and emotional 
6 See Kant [1790].
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measure. It is either a unique kind of balance or a 
unique acceptance of unbalance: we measure that 
which we long for through symbolic figuration or 
else, lost, we fall down, dragging with us our own 
strength and taking pleasure in that, gestures that 
reveal the tension and content in the longing by 
which we are measured.  
Of course, these different degrees of the 
unrepresentable intersect and interweave with one 
another, with specific consideration, according to 
the act of representation. 
Torments
Here we find ourselves at a point in which 
imagination ceases to be a realm, as its scintillat-
ing borders darken and measurelessness becomes 
the standard by which we measure ourselves, 
something we cannot measure up to, only subject 
ourselves to; the unrepresentable par excellence: 
the unfamiliar made visible insofar as it is depict-
ed as visible – as photographable, for instance. 
Whoever has been burned knows that evil vibra-
tion, that acid, corrosive current that runs through 
the body and causes the teeth to gnash. This 
image (of which I have had a taste, and thus make 
no apology for it) allows me to approach that rep-
resentation that sears the conditions for all pos-
sible representation; however, that current of 
agony and torture seemingly leaves them intact 
and operating. In effect, we see visible things; in 
effect, the bodies have weight; in effect, the bod-
ies sweat and nauseating liquids and effluvia seep 
out of their openings; in effect, the bodies scream 
and writhe; but the laws of physics and chemistry, 
the geometric coordinates, numerals and cardi-
nals, fractions, rationals and irrationals and all the 
paraphernalia of the temporal systems of quantity 
and relationship remain unvanquished, nothing 
is too large or too powerful: it is something that 
fits in a man’s hand, in a hole, under the shower; 
it can be an injection, a scalpel cut, a luminous 
burst; all things that are measurable and serially 
produced. And God, too, may come to someone’s 
mind, someone may beg, someone may try to 
defend God, especially after, later, even by means 
of the most subtle doctrine, making divine gran-
deur coincide or explode with their own power-
lessness, a poor, forsaken God, like the one Hans 
Jonas imagined in “The Concept of God after 
Auschwitz”7, drawing inspiration, without having 
properly read her, from Etty Hillesum8.   
The Impossible Witness
The fact of representing does not cancel, as 
concerns the represented, the inherence of unrep-
resentability (much in the same way that, as Ben-
jamin taught us9, the fact that we have forgotten 
the unforgettable does not alter its unforgettable 
quality: it simply shows that we are no longer able 
to recognise what is worthy of our remembrance), 
but it carries within itself an inability to accept the 
unrepresentable, since what is before us is visibly 
representable, naturally photographable. An irre-
sistible inference leads us to state: if this is visible 
it is representable, and if that visible unfamiliar is 
representable, then it cannot be unrepresentable. 
Here we have a serious form of blindness concern-
ing the reciprocal rapport between representable 
and unrepresentable, akin to that blindness that, 
through obedience of the principle of non-con-
tradiction, refuse to acknowledge that an empty 
room can be filled with light at the same time. 
Wittgenstein beckons once again10.
Manifold are the attempts at justifying this 
blindness, within the scope of some social or 
anthropological theory, moral doctrine or aes-
thetic interpretation. The most powerful instance 
remains the moral doctrine of testimony, 
expressed in the act of bearing witness. In border-
line cases, that is to say, in those cases in which 
the unrepresentable has fallen upon the represent-
ed at the precise moment of representation, cap-
tured by a revealing operation, namely a photo-
graphic operation: it is at that point that both the 
name and the action of witnessing find themselves 
7 See Jonas [1987].
8 See Hillesum [1984] and Hillesum [1986].
9 See Benjamin [1921].
10 See Wittgenstein [1968].
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in captivity. 
From that captivity emerges the paradox of the 
witness (of war, of unbearable pain, of the refugee 
camp): the unrepresentable can only be witnessed 
by those who no longer can, who will never again 
be able to witness, who are now unable to witness, 
now and forever. We call them living testimonies, 
depicted in images as emissaries that certify a cer-
tain state of affairs, but they cannot in any way 
detach themselves from that of which they are the 
living real testimonies, for they were cast into an 
abyss where categories and ways of saying have 
become empty, where being a mother, a father, a 
son, a sister, breathing, breathing, eating or desir-
ing have all become intangible; in other words, it 
is no longer possible by any means go on living, 
even though you go on living.  
At this point, photography definitely obscures 
the visible because it is so visible, thoroughly vis-
ible, blinding anyone who looks at it. Once the 
visible has been represented (we no longer know 
what is shown: what imaginative forms are these? 
nor who is expressing him/herself here: the pho-
tographer?), the unrepresentable coincides with 
our blind gaze and is submerged, devoured and 
confused with the rhetoric proper to the condi-
tions of representation. The only response would 
be to close our eyes, to cast down our eyes, to cov-
er our ears, to let out a thousand screams, to fall 
down. But also to wipe the sweat off one’s brow, to 
lie down on one’s side, to open the door. There are 
instances, however, in which the photographer is 
part of that number of witnesses who will never 
manage to bear witness, turned into ashes now or 
soon. Out of that group he stands out, obscure, 
spectral, his heart in his mouth (though that 
image from language has never shown its inad-
equacy as much as it does in here), insane and 
saner than we may be able to see. We will return 
to this, or to something close. 
The Goldsmith’s Art 
No one is able to regulate the photographer’s 
responsibility or even to simply assign responsi-
bility to the photographer (as if photography, due 
to its very nature, were an ethical gesture, either 
as possible grounds for some ethical judgement, 
under the disguise of a moralistic advisor, or by 
being evaluated from the standpoint of a moral 
and political belief – belonging to the critic, to 
the exhibition’s curator, to the museum director). 
Nothing can be added, from a photographic point 
of view, to the photograph, by saying: ‘the pho-
tographer’s courage in taking this photograph...’ 
(for whom? in the name of whom? in favour of 
whom? for the intervention of whom?). This ties 
us to an indistinct, perverted language in which 
ideology, journalism and aesthetics mingle, in an 
attempt to overrule photographic representation 
and its inherent paradoxes, even jeopardizing the 
possibility of a true discussion about them, and 
suppressing our wonder over what we see photo-
graphed, which is no real thing, but how a thing 
looks after being shot, plus all the subsequent 
optical, chemical and electronic operations.
Does art save us? Does photography save us? 
From what? Is our life in images? Yes, yes. No, no. 
Be they polished chains, to be the goldsmith of 
one’s own fetters (words put by Paul Valéry in the 
mouth of his Socrates11), or the finest sarcopha-
gus, images do not save our life, or save us from it: 
they report it, glorify it, scorn it, fear it, accept it; 
but all this is always the issue of an act of presen-
tation, not a way of making a decision about our 
life. 
In the 20th century, Hermann Broch12 and 
Gerhard Richter13 expressed, with greater inten-
sity than many others, a keen awareness of such 
concerns. The mix-ups between art and life, on 
the one hand, and the growing muteness of art 
regarding life, on the other, combined with the 
enormous, unbearable weariness of art, in its 
old age, amount in their minds to an irreparable 
loss: art is no longer a divine calling. And yet, we 
might add: that’s nothing new! In fact, it is appar-
ently nothing new; in Western history, the expe-
rience of loss is a recurring feature. However, the 
11 See Valéry [1921].
12 See Broch [2002].
13 See Richter [1995]. 
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experience of continuing to do something while 
being unbearably certain of its meaninglessness, 
that is new; before Broch, no one had told us the 
following: ‘I feel like a man who hurries to finish a 
book only to include it into the library of Alexan-
dria just before its burning’14. 
Folk wisdom tells us that a dog’s bite is healed 
with the same dog’s hair, which can be transliter-
ated and adapted as follows: both the crown of 
thorns and the crown of glory of art, and pho-
tography, search for one another, substitute one 
another and coincide all the time; that is the rea-
son why only photography itself – and never a 
theory – will ever be able to redeem its deadly 
deliriums. 
Conditional Freedoms and Compassionate Grounds
All this breeds mistrust. Some use it as cen-
sors, inspectors of photographic purity, polic-
ing the photograph’s level of ‘having been there’, 
deciding what is a photograph and what is not, 
attempting to annihilate those photographs in 
which time’s bite has been somewhat eradicated 
(since it is impossible to fully eradicate it and still 
remain within the sphere of photographic repre-
sentation) or at least taken in. Then, the degree 
of treason or fidelity, the degree of disobedience 
to certain principles of photographic ethics, writ-
ten on a few very sensitive hearts, is measured and 
an ontological table is defined: this kind of beings 
is more worthy of being photographed than that 
other, a photograph becomes more exalted when 
it features such beings. Its reality lessened due to 
choices that are unjustifiable in the legislator’s 
eyes, the photograph is a degraded, sinful image, 
subjecting itself to the consequences of temper-
ance: a summary trial.     
We find another effect of mistrust in those 
who — intimately despising, like Baudelaire15, 
photography’s representational crudeness, its apti-
tude to serve the crowd’s insatiable appetite for 
mimetism — wish to wipe out the ‘having been 
14 See Broch [1980].
15 See Baudelaire [1859].
there’, as an impure contamination that strikes 
photographic expression dead. In their eyes, pho-
tography is purely a medium; and yet, and precise-
ly because it is a medium, a specific instrument 
of representation, that contamination cannot be 
leached out.  
The above considerations should be read as 
a description of the extremes between which 
the relationship between photographer and art-
ist, photography and art develops. Of course, the 
countless hues and various shades that tinge that 
relationship should also be listed, but that listing 
cannot be made just by wishing it done, and much 
less by hearsay. Strictly speaking, photography 
was, and will be, made with any kind of camera 
and about anything: in each different case there is 
a new rule to find.
Inherently representational media, such as 
photography, are fertile breeding-grounds of mag-
ic power, and imaginative expression cannot avoid 
plunging into these reproductive waters, even if 
with the intention of changing their composition, 
and even of poisoning them, making them unusa-
ble for a while and triggering end-of-photography 
fears. Sometimes, it is simply a matter of bringing 
down too-high temperatures, namely through sub-
jective indifference, which turns the photographed 
one’s ‘having been there’ into something brutally 
innocuous. There are cases, however, in which that 
bite spread rapidly through the image, causing 
fearful infections. 
The Mystical Body
Let us now return to that unrepresentable that 
belongs neither to the beautiful not to the sublime. 
Dimming eyes are doomed by the images that 
accumulate without possible release: to be unable 
to see, to be unable to have, and keep, an image, 
possibly a saving one (to again hear the word spo-
ken by the mother at the moment of her death, 
as the character in Vergílio Ferreira’s Para Sempre 
hopes to16), and then someone photographs those 
eyes: what do we see? The scandal of an unrepre-
16 See Ferreira [1983].
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sentable secret that has been left intact and intan-
gible, in our hand and within our reach, by photo-
graphic representation.   
A man has been shot in the head; he did not 
die, but is now blind and crawls on all fours across 
the ground, moaning and screaming that he is 
blind, he crawls in circles, pain and fear drip from 
his mouth, revolting and supplicating: do I photo-
graph him? 
Now and then, nausea or a flinch pass through 
our gaze, as it runs freely over the photographs, 
at the moment in which the photographed man 
appears not to withdraw from the photograph; he 
does not recoil nor step back, he is simply there 
at our mercy and, a witness to our officiating 
power, accuses, accuses our gaze. That, it seems, 
is the existential mode of photography, its dan-
ger, its very own uneasiness, the specific initiatory 
condition that expresses art’s sacrificial nature, as 
a development of the action in which the actor 
looks at himself as he acts, and implies the sepa-
ration of the one who contemplates and the one 
who acts, who is the object of the former’s con-
templation, a separation that lies at the root of 
artistic pleasure. The protagonists of the sacrifice 
are the officiant and his victim, but in art, and 
especially in photography, unlike what happens 
in a real sacrifice, the tension between the victim, 
that offering to a deity, and the sacrificer’s eye is 
never resolved by distance. The yet-unabsorbed 
part of that tension — which no cosmic, religious 
or political justification will ever truly absorb, 
though such is its purpose — may take this form:
one feels the other
one sees the other
one hears the other
one questions the other
one knows the other
each one dies with oneself
I interpret the photographer’s gesture as a 
response to having been caught by something, 
falling into the category of the one who sees (feels, 
hears, questions, knows) the other in action, the 
category of the officiant, followed, in improbable 
simultaneity, by being caught by what he sees and 
identifying now with the victim, and so on.
Carried away by photography’s way of express-
ing its representational nature, the photographed 
one lets out a scream: we will never be able to 
hear it unless we suspend our gaze, once we have 
used it to scrutinise the picture. This inaudible 
scream is a memento of the photographic image’s 
paradox, in which the stepping back of the imag-
ined from its image, which can go as far as a leap 
backwards, into the distance, into eternity, mixes 
with the refusal to withdraw, and all this is the 
product of the photographed one’s bite into the 
image. It is from this contagion that the photo-
graphic aura and magic are derived17.  
The mystical body is born of the noxious body, 
of the suffering body, of the body on the verge of 
putrefaction, of the delirious, amorous body in a 
trance. The photographic body inherently abdi-
cates that transfiguration, whose mystery can only 
be communicated in the realm of the living and 
the dead. And yet, the living body ‘having been 
there’, a kind of ghost of the noxious body satu-
rates materials more sensitive than hearts, and 
thus the glorified body can be reborn, but only in 
things composed of paper, chemicals and electron-
ic engineering.   
Should we love more photography or that 
which photography devours and reproductively 
diffuses? Disjunction is not always disjunctive, 
especially in those moments of splendour when 
the horse of life passes swiftly by, dragging before 
us, for the first time, an image, which we follow.  
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